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Privatization and Public Law Values:
A View from France
MANUEL TIRARD*
ABSTRACT
This article uses a comparative approach to explore privatization and its conse-
quences on public law values. It discusses the French model for protecting these values,
which limits the scope ofprivatization and applies a legal regime within which public
law norms play an active role. While it does not suggest that this model can or should
be applied in the United States, it does express that the French experience can enrich
American debates on the subject.
INTRODUCTION
As Paul Seidenstat noted a few years ago, "[t]he role of government in the
marketplace has been subject to the many crosswinds of change since World War
II. The overriding movement that has occurred since the end of the 197 0s has
been in the direction of less dependence on government and more reliance on the
private sector."1 British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and President Ronald
Reagan led this revolution to privatization. Nowadays, every country is undergo-
ing such a process.
Because too many subjects under the same microscope may obscure the pic-
ture with this word, this article explores from a comparative perspective a precise
form of privatization and its consequences on public law values.
Privatization is broadly defined as "the shifting of a function, either in whole
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or in part, from the public sector to the private sector."2 Because the concept does
not refer to the same realities in the United States and in Europe,3 this article
makes the choice of a pragmatic approach.
Privatization has known a variety of forms all around the world for a few
decades, and the list of specific techniques frequently associated with it can be a
lengthy one. The most common instruments are contracting out and selling gov-
ernment-owned assets, but broader definitions exist and include a wide range of
public-private partnerships,4 such as vouchers.5 However, vouchers are less com-
mon in Europe.6 That is why, at first glance, this article only focuses on the trans-
fer of state assets and state functions to private hands.
Differences still exist between the European and the American debates within
such a scope of analysis. Matthew Crenson states that "[i1n the United States, priva-
tization rarely means the outright sale of public assets to private purchasers .... In
most cases ... privatization refers to the use of nongovernmental organizations to
run government programs."' Thus, the pattern of privatization typically followed in
the United States means "retaining collective financing but delegating performance
to the private sector."8 Therefore, contracting out is fundamental.'
2. HARVEY B. FEIGENBAUM ET AL., SHRINKING THE STATE: THE POLITICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF
PRIVATIZATION 1 (1999);seealso BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1214-15 (7thed. 1999) ("[t]he actor process
of converting a business or industry from governmental ownership or control to private enterprise").
3. Whereas in the United States "privatization" is generally used as a generic term, there is a
distinction in Europe between "privatization," "deregulation," and "liberalization." For a discus-
sion of the differences between privatization in the United States and in Europe, see Giando-
menico Majone, Paradoxes of Privatization and Deregulation, 4 EUR. PUB. POLy 53 (1994).
4. See generally CHRISTOPHER HOOD, TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT (1986); LESTER M. SALAMON, THE
TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE (2002).
5. See, e.g., C. EUGENE STEUERLE ET AL., VOUCHERS AND THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES (2000).
6. See Arthur B. Ringeling, European Experience with Tools of Government, in SALAMON, supra
note 4, at 585-99.
7. MATTHEW A. CRENSON & BENJAMIN GINSBERG, DOWNSIZING DEMOCRACY: How AMERICA
SIDELINED ITS CITIZENS AND PRIVATIZED ITS PUBLIC 202-03 (2002).
8. JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION: PUBLIC ENDS, PRIVATE MEANS 7 (1989);see
also SEIDENSTAT, supra note 1, at 9 ("[T]he dominance of contracting out [in the United States] as
the preferred method of privatization [at the state level at least] is clear. Overall, in 1993, 78 percent
of state agencies used contracting out as the primary privatization device. The pattern at the local
level also reflects this pattern."); Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions and the New Ad-
ministrative Law, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 813, 821-22 ("In the United States, many social services have
long been funded by government agencies but provided by non-government actors. Other services,
such as prison operation, have been traditionally performed by government and only recently con-
tracted out to market.").
9. Steven J. Kelman, Contracting, in SALAMON, supra note 4, at 283 (making a distinction be-
tween "contracting for procurement of products and services used directly by the government
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By contrast, in Europe and especially in France,"0 the debates have historically
focused on the sale of state enterprises. Although very common, the topic of con-
tracting out has not received much attention in comparative analysis. The French
perspectives and findings, however, may be interesting for the United States, espe-
cially those regardingla dlMgation de service public.2 That is why this article mainly
explores contracting out, 3 even if privatization can be defined in a larger sense.
A study on privatization raises a certain number of issues, and notably ques-
tions the fate of public law values."4 Because the French and American concep-
tions of public law are different, 5 the French experience can provide thoughtful
insights to the American debates over the protection of these values in the process
of contracting out public functions.
In general terms, the French debate over privatization must be analyzed in
the light of a profound cultural preoccupation with the state and its purposes-a
preoccupation that is alien to British and American political cultures. As opposed
agency and contracting for the delivery of government-funded services by third parties to external
recipients."). The distinction is close to the French one between marchospublics and dlgations de
la gestion de services publics (or dal gations de services publics). This article focuses on the second
category. The contractual device is useful to describe such a transfer of state functions to the pri-
vate sector but also contractual approaches to regulation. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The Contracting
State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155, 155 (2000) (assuming that "[tihe modern administrative state
might aptly be dubbed 'the contracting state'). However, this article does not explore regulation.
10. See, e.g., CosMo GRAHAM & TONY PROSSER, PRIVATIZING PUBLIC ENTERPRISES: CONSTITUTIONS,
THE STATE, AND REGULATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 105-137 (1991); NIKOLAOS ZAHARIADIS,
MARKETS, STATES, AND PUBLIC POLICY: PRIVATIZATION IN BRITAIN AND FRANCE 3-16 (1995).
11. For a recent analysis, see Michel Berne & Gerard Pogorel, Privatization Experiences in France, in
MARKO KOTHENBURGER ET AL., PRIVATIZATION EXPERIENCES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 163-97 (2006).
12. See generally Kelman, supra note 9. The dlrgation de service public in France is open for both
public and private contractors, even if private parties are most of the time involved. Public au-
thorities may delegate either a "public service industrial and commercial" (service public industriel
et commercial) or a "service public administrative" (service public administratif). Their legal re-
gimes are different. See infra Part II for details.
13. However, privatization of the assets in France must be studied in order to understand con-
tracting out. That is why this article deals with it. See infra Part I.A. for details.
14. For a global analysis, see Ellen Dannin, Red Tape or Accountability: Privatization, Public-
ization, and Public Values, 15 CORN. J. L. & PUB. Poi'Y 111 (2005); Mark H. Moore, Introduction to
Symposium: Public Values in an Era of Privatization, Introduction, 116 HARv L. REV. 1212 (2003).
15. In the common law world, "public law" refers to "[t]he body of law dealing with the rela-
tions between private individuals and the government, and with the structure and operation of the
government itself; constitutional law, criminal law, and administrative law taken together." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 1244. This article focuses on constitutional and administrative
laws. There is the same formal definition in France; however, "public law" is more directly con-
nected to the Roman conception of the res publica. ELISABETH ZOLLER, INTRODUCTION To PUBLIC
LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 3 (2008).
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to the common law tradition that equates government and state, civil law coun-
tries make a clear distinction between the two concepts. In French public law, the
state is not the government but rather the respublica.'6
In the common law tradition, the basic model of constitutionalism denotes
negative limits on state action. Reflecting this classical distrust of the state, the
Constitution of the United States imposes various restrictions on the exercise of
governmental power.7 Administrative law has also followed these outlines.
Therefore, the U.S. government has very few substantive rights. Public law and
its values such as accountability, due process, and fairness, are mainly procedural.
Furthermore, because state actors trigger constitutional and administrative pro-
tections while non-state actors usually do not,8 the use of private parties to per-
form public functions" obstructs the protection of these values."
In France, by contrast, the state has always been considered indispensable be-
cause of its role in protecting and developing the respublica.2' Consequently, it has
positive rights and duties. This particularism must be understood within the
French Republican model and its conception of "public interest" (l'intirtgdndral)
and "public service" (le service public). It explains why public law values from a
French perspective are more substantive than procedural and refer to the motto of
the Republic: "liberty, equality, fraternity" (libertd, 6galiti,fraternit). Hence, pub-
lic law norms may apply to private parties. Therefore, public law values do not
disappear with privatization.
This background helps explain what can be considered a paradox. The new
policy regarding privatization in France was triggered by the same factors as else-
16. ZOLLER, supra note 15, at 199.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law"); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § l("nor
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process").
18. Regarding the problems of the state action doctrine, see, for example, Daphne Barak-Erez,
A State Action Doctrinefor an Age of Privatization, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1169, 1183-86 (1995); Erwin
Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 534-35 (1985); Robert S. Gilmour
& Laura S. Jensen, Reinventing Government Accountability: Public Functions, Privatization, and the
Meaning of "State Action," 58 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 247 (1998).
19. This trend is referred to as "government by proxy" or "third-party government." DONALD F.
KETTL, GOVERNMENT BY PROXY: (MIs?) MANAGING FEDERAL PROGRAMS (1987); Lester M. Salamon,
Rethinking Public Management: Third-Party Government and the Changing Forms of Government
Action, 29 PUB. PoL'y 255 (1981).
20. It is generally considered as a source of a democracy deficit. See, e.g., ALFRED C. AMAN, JR.,
THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT: TAMING GLOBALIZATION THROUGH LAW REFORM (2004).
21. Something close is the Charles River Bridge case in which Chief Justice Taney declared that
"the object and end of all government is to promote the happiness and prosperity of the commu-
nity by which it is established." Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420, 422 (1837).
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where and resulted in a great shift from the public to the private sector. However,
the conditions and consequences of privatization have been different in France
than in the United States. In particular, the French government has shrunk, but
the reach of public law has not receded. The reasons are twofold: first, the French
government maintains core governmental functions within the public sphere
(Part I); second, public law norms still cover privatized functions (Part II).
I. THE SCOPE OF PRIVATIZATION
Like many other states, France has undertaken programs to privatize both
public enterprises and public functions. As for the United States, scholars wonder
if privatization is (or may be) limited by current U.S. law,22 but in practice nearly
all activities seem open to privatization.
23
The French particularism helps explain by contrast why such processes meet
limitations, expressed through concrete illustrations.
24
22. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette & Paul B. Stephan III, Constitutional Limitations on Privatization,
46 AM. J. COMp. L. 481, 482 (1998) ("It is hard to identify any function that, as a constitutional
matter, has been characterized as inherently public. In particular, we cannot find any decision that
unambiguously declares than [sic] any particular governmental service may not be contracted out
to private providers."); Ronald C. Moe, Exploring the Limits of Privatization, 47 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
453 (1987); Jody Freeman, Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 581 (2000)
("The federal government thus retains considerable flexibility to make substantial delegations of
its responsibilities, and even of functions closely associated with core sovereign powers, to private
parties."). Therefore scholars often try to limit the privatization situations. See, e.g., Gillian E.
Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003); Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law
Limitations on Privatization of Government Functions, 84 N.C. L. REV. 397, 401 (2006) [hereinafter
Public Law Limitations]; Paul R. Verkuil, The Non Delagable Duty to Govern (Cardozo Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 149), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract
_id=871455.
23. The argument in the United States on exclusively public functions exists but is really differ-
ent from the French one. See, e.g., Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164 (1978) (including
"education, fire and police protection, and tax collection" as public functions, but explicitly with-
holding judgment as to whether government "might be free to delegate to private parties the per-
formance of such functions and thereby avoid the strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment").
24. Thus, the French experience could enrich American debates. See, e.g., Verkuil, Public Law
Limitations, supra note 22, at 401 ("Accepting privatization ... need not mean the end of public law;
indeed, public law limitations must be satisfied before some government functions can be out-
sourced").
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A. Privatization in the French Context
Because of the particular nature of the debate in France over the state and the
market, the very definition of privatization has undergone certain theoretical lim-
itations.
1. The Background: the Debate over the State and the Market
The role of state intervention in the French economy has been sizable since
the time of Louis XIV. Some of the tasks of the "Nation" were already mentioned
in the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen.25 Here lie the roots
of the French particularism regarding privatization.
The present French Republican model is based on the concept of public ser-
vice, which is "la raison d'ftre de l'Administration."26 This concept is quite hard to
define for Anglo-Saxon lawyers.27 The most comprehensive definition comes
from Bernard Schwartz, who noted in a broad sense that a public service is "a
means provided by the public authorities to satisfy general social needs."28 It has
been considered the foundation of French administrative law,29 and some authors
even tried to build a conception of the state on the notion."
Since the end of the nineteenth century, public services have been considered
indispensable tools to the functioning and development of society. Orchestrated
around the state and around the French conception of the respublica, France has
long been considered a "cooperation of public services."31 A turning point in that
history is the Preamble to the 1946 Constitution, which contains many provisions
25. See, e.g., article 12: "To guarantee the Rights of Man and of the Citizens, a public force is
necessary." Article 13: "For the maintenance of the public force, and for administrative expenses,
a general tax is indispensable." Translations are from VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COM-
PARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 565 (1999).
26. RENi CHAPUS, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF GENERAL VOLUME 1, at 573 (15th ed., 2001).
27. It is harder to define it in English. Tony Prosser summarizes it as "an activity in the general
interest, provided by a public or private actor and subject to a special legal regime requiring equal-
ity of treatment, adaptation to changing needs and security of supply, etc." Tony Prosser, Public
Service Law: Privatization's Unexpected Offspring, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 76 (2000). But he
added in a footnote that his "[t]ranslation is a loose one in view of the difficulty in conveying the
flavour of the concept in English." Id.
28. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE COMMON-LAW WORLD 68
(1954) (quoting APPLETON, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE CONTENTIEUX ADMINISTRATIF 114 (1927)).
29. See id. at 1-18 (providing a good introduction to general principles of French administrative
law).
30. L6on Duguit, The Concept of Public Service, 32 YALE L. J. 425 (1923).
31. Id. at 431.
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regarding state duties, including education,32 health care, and general welfare.3
The most important provision concerning privatization states, "all property and
all enterprises that have or that may acquire the character of a (national) public
service or a de facto monopoly shall become the property of society."34
The importance of public services has been implemented in two ways:
through public direction35 and granting public service delegations for private con-
cerns. Thus, private enterprises have always contracted with the Administration
to fulfill public activities.36 Public service is not, and has never been, synonymous
with public ownership.
Since the end of the 1970s, the dominant global trend has been towards the
direction of less dependence on government and more reliance on market mecha-
nisms.3 7 Underlying much of this reform surge is a set of theories that portrays
government agencies" as tightly structured hierarchies insulated from market
forces and citizen pressure, and therefore free to serve the personal and institu-
tional interests of bureaucrats instead. 9 Private initiative has been favored over
state intervention, and France has not been an exception to this general trend.
However, the French debates over privatization were particularly active during
the 1980s because of the specificities regarding public services. Some French scholars
even argued that certain public services could not be privatized due to their govern-
32. 1946 CONST. pmbl. § 13 ("The Nation guarantees equal access for children and adults to
instruction, vocational training and culture. The provision of free, public and secular education at
all levels is a duty of the State.").
33. Id. at § 11 ("[The Nation] shall guarantee to all, notably to children, mothers and elderly
workers, protection of their health, material security, rest and leisure. All people who, by virtue of
their age, physical or mental condition, or economic situation, are incapable of working, shall have
to the right to receive suitable means of existence from society.").
34. Id. at § 9.
35. Public direction has been organized through either public enterprises (especially after World War
II with nationalizations of electricity and gas) or other legal forms (the most common is the r6gie).
36. See, e.g., Conseil d'Etat [CEl [highest administrative court], Jan. 10, 1902, Gaz de Deville-
ls-Rouen Rec. Lebon 5. But private companies have also been involved in carrying out public
services without any contract with public authorities. See, e.g., CE Ass., May 13, 1938, Caisse Pri-
maire Aide et Protection Rec. Lebon 417.
37. See, e.g., DAVID E. OSBORNE & TED A. GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: How THE EN-
TREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT Is TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR (1992) (one of the most important
books in this global trend); SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE: THE DIFFUSION OF POWER
IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (1996); WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997: THE STATE IN
A CHANGING WORLD (1997).
38. The word "agency" refers to the American experience. Concerning France, this article refers
to "Administration" or "public entity/authority."
39. See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962).
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mental nature." In practical terms France was the exception, at least initially, to the
worldwide privatization trend. It experimented with Keynesianism in 1981, just as
its partners were abandoning the approach, and extended, rather than retracted, the
state by nationalizations. Nevertheless, in 1986, the coalition of right parties came to
power and passed laws authorizing the denationalization of public firms. 4'
Consequently, the Constitutional Council, the highest judicial body in consti-
tutional matters, was asked to answer the fundamental question of whether there
are limitations to privatization.
2. Theoretical Limits: Core Governmental Functions
The Constitutional Council declared in 1986 that some core governmental
activities and corresponding public services cannot be privatized because they de-
rive from the Constitution.4 2 These public services, called "constitutional public
services,' 43 include justice, police, defense, education, and health care.44 The Coun-
cil reached the same findings in several matters regarding the sale of public enter-
prises." Today, every public firm seems open to privatization because none of
them express constitutional functions.4 6
This concept resonates with Anglo-Saxon experiences. 47 It is, for example, at
odds with Tony Prosser's findings, which noted a few years ago that "the United
Kingdom experience shows quite clearly that there is no core governmental activ-
ity which cannot be privatized."4'8
40. See infra Part I.A.2.
41. Law No. 86-793 of July 2, 1986, Journal Officiel de la R6publique Frangaise [J.O.] [Official
Gazette of France], July 3, 1986, p. 8240.
42. Conseil constitutionnel [hereinafter CC] decision no. 86-207 DC, June 25-26, 1986, J.O.,
June 27, 1986, p. 7978 at § 53, available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/decision/1986/
86207dc.htm.
43. See, e.g., Louis Favoreu, Service public et Constitution, AJDA 16 (June 20, 1997).
44. See infra Part I.B. for details.
45. See, e.g., CC decision no. 87-232 DC, Jan. 7, 1988, J.O. 482; CC decision no. 96-380 DC, July
23, 1996, J.O. 11408; CC decision no. 2006-543 DC, Nov. 30, 2006, J.O. 18544.
46. See, e.g., Jean-Pierre Duprat, les Garanties Constitutionnelles d l'Epreuve des Privatisations,
rapport frangais pour le Congr&s de I'AIDC (2007), available at www.afdc.fr.
47. The French findings are close to some American debates. See, e.g., Kelman, supra note 9, at
307 ("certain activities are regarded as 'inherently governmental' because they involve making
policy decisions or rely on the government's monopoly of the legitimate use of violence, and there-
fore are inappropriate for contracting no matter what the other advantages of contracting might
be. This argument would apply to contracting out diplomacy or IRS tax enforcement, and could,
in my view, convincingly be applied to contracting out the operation of prisons or welfare benefit
determination decisions."). See generally supra note 22.
48. Tony Prosser, Social Limits to Privatization, 21 BROOK. J. IN T'L. L. 213, 218 (1995).
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If the Constitutional Council has mostly dealt with cases concerning privatiza-
tion of public firms,49 the French movement toward contracting out has nevertheless
been also essential. Private companies are now involved in performing many public
services, such as the provision of water and transportation, as well as more tradi-
tional public activities such as education. The potential scope of this movement must
be understood with the same reasoning: because some functions are considered the
core of public life-the core of the government, they cannot be privatized, regardless
of the form (transfer of public assets or public functions) or the beneficiary of priva-
tization (profit or nonprofit organizations). The practical implementation of such a
rule concerning contracting out has been carried out by the Council of State.5"
It is important to detail the prohibition before making it explicit with con-
crete examples. Indeed, some activities within a constitutional public service may
be open to delegation. There is a distinction within such a public service between
the core governmental function per se on the one hand, that is to say the genuine
fundamental public activity protected by the Constitution, and a complementary
function on the other. For example, delegating the provision of food service in a
police station seems less problematic than delegating the control of people in the
streets. As the general principle stated above, the former activity can be out-
sourced, the latter cannot.
There is a second and more disturbing situation in which core governmental
functions are entirely open to delegation. The most important sectors are educa-
tion and health care. That is why scholars draw a distinction within constitutional
public services between those linked to sovereignty (e.g., police and defense), and
the rest (e.g., education and health care).5"
Given the complexity of the theory, the article turns now to more concrete
examples.
B. Concrete Limitations to Privatization
Although non-exhaustive, the following discussion will brush through vari-
ous examples that are relevant to the French experience.52
49. The only case directly dealing with contracting out is CC decision no. 90-285 DC, Dec. 28,
1990, J.O., p. 16609. See infra note 69 for details.
50. See infra Part I.B. for concrete examples.
51. See Favoreu, supra note 43.
52. Because of the complexity, this article will only take a general stand. For details,see CE, Oct.
7, 1986 in YvEs GAUDEMET ET AL., LES GRANDS AVIS DU CONSEIL D'ETAT 333-34 (2d ed. 2002).
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1. Policing Activities
The Council of State has always ruled that core governmental functions such as
controlling and punishing citizens cannot be contracted out.53 However, complemen-
tary activities such as the organization of street parking, vehicle towing, or telepro-
cessing may be delegated because they are not directly connected with this core.14
For the past twenty years, France has enacted legislations allowing private
actor involvement in policing activities, especially in airports and malls.5 Never-
theless, they are neither allowed to control nor to arrest people and are strictly
supervised by public authorities. Private participation in this field seems more re-
stricted and at the same time more controlled than in the United States. 6
2. Prisons and justice
Similar to prohibitions against policing activities, French law restricts delega-
tion of justice and prison activities; specifically, the control and punishment of
citizens, deprivation of liberty, and custodial functions.
With respect to prisons, privatization covers a wide spectrum of issues. It
starts in areas that are not generally contentious, such as issuing commercial con-
tracts for the canteen or shop in which prisoners can purchase items for their
personal use. The next stage in privatization is that in which specific services,
such as drug treatment or other programs for prisoners, are delivered by commer-
cial companies or nonprofit organizations. Moving further along the spectrum, in
some cases contracts are issued for the central services within the prison. The
contracts can include custodial activities, supervision, and education of prisoners.
Privatization of prisons was an important issue in France in 1987 when the
government decided to expand accommodation and invited the private sector to
participate. At the outset, the expectation was that the operation of these new
prisons should be wholly privatized, that is to say all functions would have been
contracted out to the private sector, from garbage removal to education and man-
53. CE, June 17, 1932, Ville de Castelnaudary Rec. Lebon 595; CE, Apr. 1,1994, Commune de
Menton Rec. Lebon 176; CE, Dec. 29, 1997, Commune d'Ostricourt Rec. Lebon p. 706.
54. CE, Mar. 20, 1998, SEM de S~curit6 active et de t414matique, Rec. 1022.
55. Law No. 2003-1119 of Nov. 26, 2003, J.O., Nov. 27, 2003, p. 201396; Law No. 2003-239 of
Mar. 18,2003, J.O., June 5,2003, p. 9561; Law No. 96-73 of Jan. 21, 1995, J.O., Jan. 24, 1995, p. 1249
; Law No. 96-151 of Feb. 26, 1996, J.O., Feb. 27, 1996, p. 3094; Law No. 89-467 of July 10, 1989, J.O.,
July 11, 1989, p. 8672; Law No. 83-629 of July 12, 1983, J.O., July 13, 1983, p. 2 15 5 .
56. Cf Elizabeth E. Joh, Conceptualizing the Private Police, 2005 UTAH L. REv. 573, 609-11
(2005) (for a comparison with the United States); David Alan Sklansky, Private Police and Democ-
racy, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 83 (2006) (for a debate over democracy).
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agement. But in the face of opposition from various sources, privatization of the
core operational side was cancelled before it even got under way. Management
and custodial functions therefore remained as public functions. However, the
hotel functions and prison industries were awarded to private companies.57
This system of dual management, often described as semiprivate prisons
(prisons semi-priv&s), has increased in France since 1987.5" Even if France priva-
tized some functions in prisons, the state has firmly retained control of the actual
deprivation of liberty. In France, unlike the United States, punishment is a state
responsibility and entitlement. Privatization of such core functions would be the
abandonment of a governmental task.59
3. Defense
The French Department of Defense declared a few years ago that present
delegations include activities such as guarding, food service provision, and accom-
modation. Its next agenda is clear because contracting out will be pursued when
private parties are able to bring specific skills and qualifications in sectors that are
not linked to the hearth of the activity of defense.6"
It follows that France seems less concerned with problems faced by the United
States in the activities of war.6 The operation in Iraq since 2003 has been a turn-
ing point, even if the involvement of private companies has been rising for a few
decades. In Iraq, private companies participate in the whole activity of war be-
cause they have been providing logistics and site security. In addition, they have
supplied supporting weapons systems, advice and training, and armed personnel
that operate with troops on the battlefield.62
57. Law No. 87-432 of June 22, 1987, J.0., June 23, 1987, p. 6775.
58. Law No 2002-1094 of Aug. 29, 2002, J.0. Aug. 30, 2002, p. 14398. France has very recently
embarked on a prison building program of new semi-private prisons. See http://www.justice.gouv.fr/
index.php?rubrique = 10036&ssrubrique= 10262 &article = 14148
59. However, private firms have been allowed since 2002 to carry out electronic supervision of
prisoners because such activities are not connected to State sovereignty (CC decision no. 2002-461
DC, Aug. 29, 2002). See infra note 69 for details.
60. Law No. 2003-2008, Jan. 27,2003, J.0., Jan. 29,2003, p. 1744.
61. See, e.g., Jon D. Michaels, Beyond Accountability: The Constitutional, Democratic, and Strate-
gic Problems with Privatizing War, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1001 (2004) (explaining difficulties facing
countries seeking to privatize even functions that are not inherently governmental); Martha
Minow, Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges Accountability, Profession-
alism, and Democracy, 46 B.C. L. REV. 989 (2005) (indicating further problems facing the United
States with privatization in the military complex).
62. Deborah Avant, The Privatization of Security and Change in the Control of Force, 5 INT'L
STUD. PERSP. 153, 153 (2004).
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4. Education63
Education is mentioned in the French Constitution as a state duty.64 There-
fore, as a constitutional public service, education should theoretically not be open
to delegation.6 5 The Constitutional Council, nevertheless, stated in 1977 that peo-
ple have a freedom of choice between public and private education.66 Conse-
quently, there are both public and private schools in France.67 As in other
constitutional public services, the only activities that may be delegated in the for-
mer are the complementary functions (e.g., provision of food service and trans-
portation). By contrast, in the latter, the fundamental functions of education can
also be provided by the private sector, even if a few limitations exist.68
Education reveals surprising findings due to the broad participation of pri-
vate actors in a core governmental function. Moreover, it is not always easy to de-
termine within such an activity whether a particular mission is open to delegation
or not.69 Nevertheless, it does not mean that the category of constitutional public
services is an "empty bag."7" Indeed, the limited scope of privatization only repre-
sents the first aspect of the French protection of public values, which must be
evaluated hand in hand with its legal regime.
63. The following discussion equally applies to health care.
64. 1946 CoNsT.,supra note 32.
65. The debates were important at the beginning of the 1980s, and particularly in 1984, when
the government failed to subordinate all private schools to the same regime as public schools.
66. CC decision no. 77-87 DC, Nov. 23, 1977, J.O. 5529.
67. Today around 20% of young people in France attend private schools. See http://www
.education.gouv.fr/cidl95/les-chiffres-cles.html.
68. Cass. Crim 3 avril 2002, Soc. SGTE Travaux 6lectriques, cne de Saint-Maur-des-Foss&s et Cie
Axa Assurances, BJCE, septembre 2002, n' 24, p. 367, concl. D. Commaret, (applying to all schools).
69. For example, the supervision of prisoners is quite disturbing. This activity cannot be theo-
retically delegated, but the electronic supervision is delegable because it has been considered as dis-
tinct from core governmental functions. See supra note 59. Another example is tax matters. See CC
decision no. 90-285 DC,supra note 49 (the Council stated that tax collection, which is at the heart of
the governmental functions, may be delegated to a private actor when the public authority remains
in charge or exercises a control). In comparison, in the United States, the IRS has recently used pri-
vate companies to collect federal income taxes (beginning with the 2004 American Jobs creation Act).
70. See, e.g., RAMU DE BELLESCIZE, LES SERVICES PUBLICS CONSTITUTIONNELS 244 (2005).
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II. THE LEGAL REGIME OF PRIVATIZATION
Public law norms are theoretically inapplicable when a function has been
privatized in the United States.71 Therefore, the private contractor seems almost
free to deliver the service as it deems appropriate.72
In France, by contrast, as soon as the service is connected with the public interest,
private parties are subject to specific public law precepts. Consequently, contracting
out does not mean the eviction of public law values.73 This solution is deeply rooted in
the French legal history. Indeed, if one objective of public law is to protect the inter-
ests and rights of individuals against invasion by the government, as is the case in the
United States, it also has to be reconciled with a sense of the community.74
Two sets of rules apply to the French regime of contracting out.75 First, by
their very nature, public activities and related public services trigger the applica-
tion of some general public law obligations-it is the public service "d la fran-
raise." Second, other specific requirements apply directly to the delegations.
71. See supra Introduction.
72 But see Jack M. Beermann, Administrative-Law-Like Obligations on Private(ized) Entities, 49
UCLA L. REV. 1717 (2002) (arguing that privatization and deregulation usually come with strings
attached under which private entities are required to comply with governmentally prescribed stan-
dards of various forms and degrees of stringency). It depends in practice on the terms and condi-
tions of the contract.
73. For a comparison with the United States, see the agenda set forth by Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The
Limits of Globalization and the Future of Administrative Law: From Government to Governance, 8 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 379, 384-85 (2001) (advocating "the extension of various procedural ap-
proaches developed for the public sector to the private sector, albeit in new forms, so as to provide
greater transparency and accountability by private actors who carry out the public's business.... The
new administrative law should be one that focuses more on the functions and effects of the power
exercised over citizens and less on the definitional criteria by which one might distinguish the public
and private nature of the entities that actually exercise that power."). See also Jody Freeman, Extend-
ing Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARv. L. REv. 1285 (2003) (writing on the potential
for the state to "extend its reach" into the private sector through incorporation of public interest values
into private contracts and arguing that instruments such as budgeting, regulation, and contracts may
extend the province of public law); Paul Verkuil, Privatizing Due Process, 57 ADMIN. L. REv. 963
(2005); sources cited supra note 18 (concerning the reforms of the state action doctrine).
74. See CE, Rflexions sur l'intort g&inral, in RAPPORT PUBLIC 239-357 (1999).
75. See, e.g., L. NEVILLE BROWN & JOHN S. BELL, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (5th ed. 1998);
CHAPUS, supra note 26; PIERRE DEVOLVE, LE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF (4th ed. 2006); SCHWARTZ, SUpra
note 28; JURGEN SCHWARZE, EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 100-13 (2006) (for a European perspec-
tive); Jean-Bernard Auby, Administrative Law in France, in RENE SEERDEN & FRITS STROiNK, ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, ITS MEMBER STATES AND THE UNITED STATES 59-89 (2002).
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A. The General Rules: Public Service "d la Fran7aise"
Two situations reflect the importance of public law values in France and the
spirit of their protection. The first one is directly connected with the concept of
public service. The second situation applies more specifically to constitutional
public services within which whole delegations are awarded.
1. Basic Public Law Requirements: les Lois du Service Public
The concept of public service, broadly defined as a means provided by the
public authorities to satisfy general social needs, 7 6 is as essential to comprehending
the regime of contracting out as it is to understanding its scope.
Public service triggers the application of some legal obligations, known as the
"public service principles" (les lois du service public). Whether a public service is
operated by a public authority itself or by a private enterprise under administra-
tive authorization, these basic public law precepts apply.77 Thus, the province of
public law extends to private actors in such situations." Tony Prosser was right
when he stated that "[s]ervice public may also be a means of incorporating certain
social principles into the operation of private enterprises in the market place."79
The three principles governing all public services include:
a. Adaptability
The provision of a public service must adapt to evolving circumstances as may be
required by the public interest. For instance, even when the activity has been delegated
to a private actor, the Administration is nevertheless allowed to unilaterally modify the
contractual obligations if need be, regardless of the precise wording of the contract. 0
b. Continuity
The provision of a public service cannot be interrupted except in precise cir-
cumstances provided by the law. The consequences are twofold. On the one
76. See supra Part I.A.l. For purposes of this part, "public authority," "Administration," and
"State" are synonymous terms that refer to "government" or "agencies" in the United States.
77. But the converse is also true. If a specific activity does not come within the concept of public
service, then cases concerning it are within the competence of the French civil courts, even if the
particular activity happens to be one carried on by a public authority.
78. They are the minimum norms applicable to all public services. See CC decision no. 2004-501
DC, Aug. 5,2004, Rec. 134.
79. Prosser, supra note 27, at 76.
80. See infra Part II.B. for more concrete details.
81. See CC decision no. 79-105 DC, July 25, 1979, Rec. 33 (holding that this principle is protected
by the Constitution); CE, June 13, 1980, Mme Bonjean Rec. Lebon 274.
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hand, public agents have to respect some specific rules regarding strikes. On the
other, it justifies the powers of public authorities in the implementation of the
delegation, especially the power to sanction the private actor.82
c. Equality
The Constitution globally protects the principle of equality before the law and,
by so doing, equality before the public services. It also implies the neutrality of the
public service." The courts insist that all citizens should have an equal opportunity
of benefiting from public services. Unfair discrimination is strictly forbidden.
2. Extension of Public Law Norms to Delegated Constitutional Public Services
Education and health care, although considered constitutional public ser-
vices, are sometimes wholly delegated to private hands. 4 Nevertheless, the state
and public law requirements remain very active. 5
a. Education8 6
A statute enacted in 1959 regulates the relations between the state and private
schools. These schools theoretically have the choice to either contract with the state
or not. In reality, nearly all of them enter into a contract with the government for
financial assistance in exchange for their adherence to certain rules and controls.1
7
Under the terms of the "simple contract" (contrat simple) which applies to ele-
mentary schools, the government pays the salaries of teachers provided they hold the
requisite teaching qualifications. These private schools must also respect the basic
rules of public education. Secondary schools, which are the common private schools,
82. See infra Part II.B. for details.
83. Neutrality is often considered as the fourth principle. See, e.g., CC decision no. 86-217 DC,
Sept. 18, 1986, Rec. 141; CE, May 3, 2000, Mlle Marteaux J.O., June 23, 2000, p. 9471. The conse-
quences of neutrality are important, especially for religious matters. Debates are particularly im-
portant at school.
84. See supra Part I.
85. This regime is important due to the specific legal nature of outsourcing involved in such cir-
cumstances. Because they are not always considered from a legal point of view as dlegations de services
publics, the public services principles may not be applicable as such (especially in education). It follows
that public law norms through control and regulation are considered as fundamental to guarantee
public law values. Similarly, the following rules, infra Part II.B., are also applicable to these situations.
See Jacques Chevallier, L'association au service public, JCP-G 2267 (1974); NICOLE FONTAINE, LA LI-
BERTE D'ENSEIGNEMENT, DE LA Loi DEBRE A LA Loi GUERMEUR 102-03 (1978) (for education).
86. See, e.g., HOWARD D. LEWIS, THE FRENCH EDUCATION SYSTEM (1985) (providing a history of
French education).
87. If today around 20% of young people in France attend private schools, 97.4% of them study
in a school which has entered into a contract with public authorities. See supra note 67.
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 15:1
enter into a "contract of association" (contrat d'association) under which the state pays
the salaries of teachers who are public employees and provides operating expenses.
Such private schools agree to follow the same curriculum as the public sector.
In addition, the state supervises all private schools. The degree of supervision
becomes even greater when the school enters into a contract with the government
(financial control).
So in such cases, contracting out is far from being a complete privatization
without public law requirements.
b. Health Care
The role of the state is also fundamental for private health care. One must
draw a distinction between two connected steps: financing and regulation. As
James Russell states, "[t]he majority of health care spending in Europe is publicly
financed. In the United States the majority is privately financed.""8 Consequently,
"the major actors in the American health system ... are immune to government
regulation or control as they are in Europe."89
In practical terms, almost all private actors involved in health care in France
must comply with regulations enacted by a public authority. They are also more
or less supervised in the implementation of their tasks.
Once again, contracting out does not result in the release from public law duties.
B. The Specific Rules Governing the Relations of the Private Contractor
In addition to the general rules previously analyzed, there are several specific
rules that address the relations of the private contractor to the Government and to
private parties.
1. Relations with the Government
The rules applicable to both the government and the private contractor are
determined by the nature of the contract.
a. The Basis: the Legal Qualification of the Contract
As elsewhere, French public authorities generally enter into contracts for out-
sourcing public services. In France, such contracts are administrative because of
88. JAMES W. RUSSELL, DOUBLE STANDARD: SOCIAL POLICY IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES
123 (2006).
89. Id. at 123-24.
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the very nature of the public services granted. This qualification is fundamental
due to the specific rules that will apply: the public entity is the leader of the con-
tract and has specific powers. Georges Langrod was right when he stated in the
middle of the twentieth century that with the notion and the regime of adminis-
trative contracts, France ensures
the regularity and continuity of public services through a special
legal and technical conception which seems more effective and at
the same time more elastic than analogous devices known to pri-
vate law .... This justifies also the submission of administrative
contracts to a specific legal status, founded on clauses exorbitantes
unknown in private law.90
This legal status justifies the general power for public authorities to oversee
the execution of a contract and to control its termination, notwithstanding its pre-
cise terms. That is to say, many powers are deemed d'ordre public: they may be
applied even if there is no formula (or another formula) in the contract. Then the
French conception of the public interest can permit what would be considered in
the United States as a breach of contract by public entities. In such cases, the law
of the contract is not always the law of the parties.
b. Specific Powers of Public Authorities9
* The provision of public services is strictly supervised by public
authorities. This control can be extended to all needed mea-
sures, except that the Administration cannot be regarded as
exercising the mission itself;
" If the private party fails to carry out its mission, the Adminis-
tration can levy specific penalties without prior recourse to a
court. These penalties may be financial or coercive;
* Public entities can also unilaterally modify the contract. The
public entities have powers to redefine the character of the ser-
vice to be performed or the work to be done in order to meet
the changing needs of the public interest (the financial ele-
90. Georges Langrod, Administrative Contracts. A Comparative Study, 4 Am. J. CoMp. L. 325,
341-42 (1955).
91. These powers notably exemplify the lois du services publics described above.
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ments of the contract, however, can never be unilaterally mod-
ified). This may involve additional costs;
Finally, the Administration may terminate the contract before
its normal term without any fault from the private party.
c. Situation of the Private Contractor
The main right of the private party firm to the delegation is financial, i.e. it
must be paid for the implementation of the public service. As a general principle,
private actors must not endanger the public interest and related public services:
they have less power than public authorities.
Nevertheless, there are a few guarantees because the powers of public au-
thorities are not absolute. The administrative courts exercise strict judicial review.
The conventionally acquired rights and even the economic interests of the private
contractor are also taken into account. 2 That is why in every situation in which
the contract has been modified, and even without any fault from the public au-
thority, the private actor has a right to financial compensation.93
Two other related theories created by the Council of State exemplify the impor-
tance of the indemnification of the contractor. An abnormal and unforeseen distur-
bance of the contractual equilibrium arises in these two situations. The disruption
results either from the public entity party to the contract (thdorie dufait du prince), or
from events external to both contracting parties (theorie de l'imprdvision). The first
theory allows a full compensation for the loss incurred whereas the second divides
the loss between both parties so as to re-establish the altered financial equilibrium.94
2. Relations with Other Private Parties
Given the delegation to the private sector, private law generally applies in the
relationships between the private actor and the users of the public service, its em-
ployees, and its contractual relations with third parties. 9 In such situations, the
most relevant French characteristic lies in the protection of rights granted to em-
ployees and users of such public services.
This protection represents one of the main problems with privatization in the
United States because the Constitution guarantees individual rights only from
92. Langrod, supra note 90, at 343.
93. CE, Mar. 11, 1910, Compagnie g~n&ale franqaise des Tramways Rec. Lebon, 216.
94. CHAPUS, supra note 26, at 1209-15.
95. However, administrative law may sometimes apply in such situations. See sources cited supra
note 75.
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governmental action. 96 For example, the Supreme Court limited the potential
reach of the due process clause in the Civil Rights Cases when it held unconstitu-
tional a federal statute that forbade discrimination in private settings.97 So the liti-
gant must prove that he is challenging a government action, whether state or
federal. This is what the problem of state action is about."
As Harold Sullivan noted in practical terms, "[e]ven when government re-
mains responsible through both funding and regulation for provision of a service,
if production is in private hands, an employee can be dismissed, and a citizen can
be denied service without the minimal constitutional safeguards that would apply
if production had been in public hands."99 Thus, "the most important consider-
ation in analyzing the rights of employees is whether the employment at issue is
public or private."'' 9 For example, whereas public employees' freedom of expres-
sion is protected by the First Amendment, private sector employees have fewer
rights to express their opinions.'
Facing such problems, U.S. scholars often try to solve the dilemma by using a
comparative perspective. 2 The French experience, although useful, usually is for-
gotten.
Rights in France are protected against private powers when privatization oc-
curs. This is not a specific protection of administrative law, but the consequence of
the French protection of rights. In France the object of the Constitution is much
larger than the attribution and the definition of rights. This attribution is a politi-
cal function that is exercised by the legislative power, which protects both public
and private persons. It implies that a third party effect doctrine seems useless.'
0 3
In practical terms, users of public services have rights (particularly equality)
against the private contractor because of the public service principles described
96. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 18-1 (2d ed. 1988).
97. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
98. See sources cited supra note 18.
99. Harold J. Sullivan, Privatization of Public Services: A Growing Threat to Constitutional Rights,
47 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 461, 464 (1987).
100. MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 408 (2d ed. 1999).
101. See Patrick Morvan, An European Look to the Workers' Freedom of Speech in American Law:
'Seeking Desperately' The First Amendment in the Workplace, availableat http://patrickmorvan.over-
blog.com/article-7349508.html.
102. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Issue of State Action/Horizontal Effect in Comparative Constitu-
tional Law, 1 INT'L J. CONST. L. 79 (2003) (comparing findings within English-speaking countries
and Germany).
103. See Michel Troper, Who Needs a Third Party Effect Doctrine-The Case of France, in THE
CONSTITUTION IN PRIVATE RELATIONS: EXPANDING CONSTITUTIONALISM 115, 128 (Andras Sajo &
Renata Utiz eds., 2005).
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above." 4 Along the same lines, all employees working in public services have im-
portant rights.0 5 In particular, when contracting out to private hands occurs, pri-
vate labor law protects the freedom of expression" 6 and due process for all
disciplinary sanctions.'
CONCLUSION
The French model represents a specific way for protecting public law values,
both by limiting the scope of privatization and by applying a legal regime within
which public law norms play an active role. This model is specific to France and
this article has not argued that it can or should be applied in the United States.
Nevertheless, it can enrich American debates.
The opposite is also true. Both globalization and European construction in-
duce major changes in the role of the state. In the last decades, private parties have
been increasingly involved in public activities.'08 Consequently, one may wonder
whether the French specificity will live or die.'0
The final issue remains how far a model can evolve without losing its spirit. A
U.S. comparison could be a good way for French scholars to determine and un-
derstand the strengths and weaknesses of their system.
104. The lois du service public apply to all public services whether publicly or privately provided.
See supra Part II.A.
105 There are potentially three categories of employees working in public service: the permanent
civil servants whose status is governed by specific public law norms (lesfonctionnaires), the civil ser-
vants with a contractual employment ruled by private law (as is mostly the case when public service
is provided by a private contractor), and other civil servants whose status is governed by public law
norms but less protective than the status of thefonctionnaires. Their situation is therefore problematic,
especially in social matters. In order to harmonize the protection, some statutes have been enacted to
grant protections to such people. The Council of State has also applied to this latter category what is
referred to as "general principles of law" (principesgn raux du droit). For example, the Council held
that the general principles that derive from the Labour code (for contracts ruled by private law) and
the status of the fonctionnaires must be extended to all employees providing a public-service. See CE
Sect., Apr. 23, 1982, Ville de Toulouse c/Mme Aragnou Rec. 152 (for a minimum guaranteed wage);
CE Ass., June 8, 1973, Dame Peynet Rec. 406 (for the protection of the pregnant).
106. C. TRAV. 120-2; C. TRAV. 122-45.
107. C. TRAy. 122-41.
108. See supra Part I.B. (regarding, for example, the increasing role of private actors in prisons
and policing activities).
109. See, e.g., Jean-Marie Pontier, Lint&ret Gntral Existe-t-il Encore?, 35 REc. DALLOZ 327 (1998).
